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Protecting Students from Abuse: Public School
District Liability for Student Sexual Abuse
Under State Child Abuse Reporting Laws
JASON P. NANCE* and PHILIP T.K. DANIEL**
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 9, 2005 a "16-year-old developmentally delayed high school
student in Columbus, Ohio told a teacher that she had been punched, then
forced to perform oral sex on two boys in the school auditorium, while
another boy videotaped them."' After being notified by a teacher of the
incident, the girl's father arrived at the school, only to be "strongly dis-
couraged" by the school principal from notifying the police.2 According
to court records, the principal instructed the school security guard to
arrange a meeting with the city police officer assigned to the school and
other staff members. She also urged the girl's father to hold off on action
until he returned the next day for that meeting. Unsatisfied with this pro-
posed response to the situation, the father called the police himself.4
Subsequently, charges were brought against the principal under an
alleged violation of Ohio's child abuse reporting statute. The principal
was later terminated from any employment in the school district., As of
the writing of this article the parents of the student have filed a civil suit
*Jason Nance is a law clerk for Kent Jordan, Judge, U.S. District Court, Delaware.
**Philip T. K. Daniel is the William and Marie Flesher Professor of Educational
Administration Adjunct Professor of Law at The Ohio State University.
1. Alayna DeMartini, Former Principal Not Guilty, Jury Says; Juror: Actions in Mifflin
Case Met Minimum Standard, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, April 29, 2006, at 1A.
2. Alayna DeMartini, Ex-Mifflin Principal Goes on Trial over Girl's Assault; Regina
Crenshaw Could Face Up to 30 Days in Jail, $250 Fine, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, April 21, 2006, at
lE; Alayna DeMartini, Former Principal Not Guilty, Jury Says; Juror: Actions in Mifflin Case
Met Minimum Standard, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, April 29, 2006, at IA.
3. Editorial, Clear Duty; Ohio Law Should Make Plain How to Report Child Abuse Quickly,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 4, 2006, at 10A.
4. Alayna DeMartini, Former Principal Not Guilty, Jury Says; Juror: Actions in Mifflin
Case Met Minimum Standard, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, April 29, 2006, at IA.
5. Alayna DeMartini, Former Principal Not Guilty, Jury Says; Juror: Actions in Miffin
Case Met Minimum Standard, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, April 29, 2006, at 1A; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§2151.42 1(A)(1)(b) (Anderson 2004).
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against the school district claiming child abuse, an absence of appropri-
ate security, and knowledge on the part of building administrators of
ongoing sexual contact among students in the school.6
Child sexual abuse7 is a problem that plagues the United States.
Although statistics on the number of child victims vary,8 one recent com-
prehensive study estimates that as many as 500,000 children are sexual-
ly abused each year.9 This same study reports that one in five girls and
one in ten to twenty boys will be sexually abused during their childhood.'
Other studies suggest that one in three girls and one in every four to seven
boys are sexually abused before turning eighteen years old." The prob-
lem of child sexual abuse has not escaped the nation's public school sys-
tems. 2 Although no one knows exactly how many children have been
sexually abused by teachers or other school employees, students from
one recent survey indicate that sexual harassment by school staff mem-
6. Encarnacion Pyle, Former Principal Battling for Name: Administrative Hearing Starts
Today for ex-Mifflin Leader, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, September 5, 2006, at ID.
7. There are many definitions of child sexual abuse. For purposes of this research, child sex-
ual abuse is defined as "any kind of exploitative sexual contact, attempted sexual contact, or sex-
ual interaction between a child under the age of 18 and any adult." Gregory G. Gordon,
Comment, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and the Statute of Limitations: The Need
for Consistent Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 1359, note 2 (1993).
8. It is difficult to estimate the number of children that are sexually abused each year
because of the wide practice of under-reporting. See John E.B. Myers, Allegations of Child
Sexual Abuse in Custody and Visitation Litigation: Recommendations for Improved Fact Finding
and Child Protection, 28 J. FAM. L. 1, 3 (1989) ("It is difficult to estimate how many children are
sexually abused each year."); FLORENCE RUSH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET: SEXUAL ABUSE OF
CHILDREN 4 (1980) (attributing some of the difficulties of estimating the extent of child sexual
abuse to under-reporting). See also Rochelle Hanson et al., Factors Related to the Reporting of
Childhood Rape, 23 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 559, 559-569 (1999) (stating that nearly 85% of
child abuse is not reported, indicating that the number of children sexually abused each year is
dramatically higher than the number of incidents reported to authorities).
9. See David Finkelhor & Jennifer Dziuba-Leatherman, Children as Victims of Violence: A
National Survey, 94 PEDIATRICS 413, 413-420 (1994) (citing empirical evidence that over 500,000
children are sexually abused each year). See also KEE MACFARLANE ET AL., SEXUAL ABUSE OF
YOUNG CHILDREN: EVALUATION AND TREATMENT 6 (1986) ("[E]stimates of the incidence of sexu-
al abuse vary dramatically .... In terms of absolute numbers, current reliable estimates range
from 100,000 to 500,000 cases per year.").
10. Finkelhor & Dziuba-Leatherman, supra note 3, at 413-420. See also DEBRA WHITCOMB
ET AL., WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 2-4 (1985) ("[F]ind-
ings suggest that anywhere from 12% to 38% of all women, and from 3% to 15% of men, are
subjected to some form of sexual abuse in their childhood.").
11. See Leslie Miller, Sexual Abuse Survivors Find Strength to Speak in Numbers, USA
TODAY, Aug. 27, 1992, at D6 (citing childhood sexual abuse statistics).
12. See Warren ex rel. Good v. Reading Sch. Dist., 278 F.3d 163, 171 (3rd Cir. 2002) ("The
number of reported cases involving sexual harassment of students in schools confirms that
harassment unfortunately is an all too common aspect of the educational experience.").
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bers is pervasive. 3 The survey reports that school personnel have sexual-
ly harassed 25% of females and 10% of males in grades 8 to 11. In 1983,
approximately one percent of adults reported they received sexual
advances from school employees when they were children, with one-
third of these indicating that sexual contact occurred.15 According to
another study, 17.7% of males and 82.2% of females graduating from
high school reported being sexually harassed by school faculty or staff
members at some time during their school years. 6 Thirteen-and-a-half
percent of these students also claimed they engaged in sexual intercourse
with their teachers. 7 Still another report suggests that up to five percent
of public school teachers abuse children. 8
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have child abuse laws in
place that require certain persons to report suspected child abuse. 9
Those held accountable include school teachers, school employees, and
school authorities. 0 Under these reporting laws, school officials are
required to report suspected sexual abuse of a student to state social
agencies or law enforcement authorities. 21 These state agencies will send
trained individuals to conduct systematic investigations to ascertain
13. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATION FOUNDATION, HOSTILE
HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICAN'S SCHOOLS 7 (1993)
(reporting results from 1,632 public school students in grades 8-11 surveyed).
14. Id.
15. 31 AM. Jut. 3D Proof of Facts §261 (2005).
16. Daniel Wishnietsky, Reported and Unreported Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment, 3 J.
EDUC. RES. 164, 164-69 (1991). See also Elizabeth Cohen, Sex Abuse of Students Common:
Research Suggests 15% ofAll Children Harassed, PRESS & SuN-BuLLETIN, February 10, 2002, at
IA (reporting that 15% of all students had experienced some type of sexual misconduct between
kindergarten and 12th grade ranging from inappropriate touching to forced penetration).
17. Id.
18. Berta Delgado & Sarah Talalay, Sex Cases Increase in Schools: Many Acts of Teacher
Misconduct Not Being Reported, SUN-SENTINEL, June 4, 1995, at IA.
19. DAVID J. SPERRY, PHILIP T.K. DANIEL, ET AL., EDUCATION LAW AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
A COMPENDIUM 112 (2d ed. 1998); Karen L. Michaelis, REPORTING CHILD ABUSE: A GUIDE TO
MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR SCHOOL PERSONNEL 2-6 (1993); Danny R. Veilleuz, Annotation,
Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statute Requiring Doctor and Other Person to
Report Child Abuse, 73 A.L.R.4TH 782, 789-790 (1989).
20. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §26-14-3 (1975) (requiring school officials to report victims of child
abuse to duly constituted authorities); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.7 (West- 2005) (requiring teach-
ers and administrators to report all cases of suspected child abuse); CONN. GEN STAT. §17a-101(b)
(Rev. to 1997) (mandating that school teachers, school principals, school guidance counselors, and
school paraprofessionals are required to report incidents of suspected child abuse); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §2151.421 (A)(1)(b) (Anderson 2004)(stating that those persons required to report sus-
pected child abuse include school teachers, school employees, and school authorities).
21. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2151.421(B) (Anderson 2004) (requiring persons to
make the report to the public children services agency or to a municipal or county peace officer).
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whether a child has been sexually abused, 22 and provide resources to the
child and the child's family.23 If, in fact, abuse has occurred, the agency
official will report the alleged offender to law enforcement officers or
prosecuting attorneys.24
Virtually all courts recognize that a child abuse reporting statute creates
a duty to children, the breach of which is the basis of a civil suit for dam-
ages.' Normally, courts recognize a duty only to the minor child about
whom school officials have received the abuse reports. 26 That is, most
courts impose civil liability on a school district when school personnel
abuse a student and school officials fail to notify the proper authorities. In
2004, the Supreme Court of Ohio extended this duty to third party student
victims27 - causes of action may be brought against school districts when
a school employee abuses one student, school officials fail to report the
abuse, and the same employee abuses a different student.
Public school students who are sexually abused by school persons
who have previously abused other students already have the option of
bringing a cause of action under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, or common law
negligence theories. 8 Questions loom as to whether the Ohio approach
provides more protection to abused students than these other remedies.
22. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §2151.421(F)(1) (Anderson 2004) (mandating specific
investigative procedures for social agencies when abuse is reported).
23. See, e.g., CONN. GEN STAT. §17a-101(a) (Rev. to 1997) (requiring "the reporting of sus-
pected child abuse, investigation of such reports by a social agency, and provision of services,
where needed, to such child and family.").
24. See, e.g., OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §2151.421(F)(2) (Anderson 2004) ("The public children
services agency shall make any recommendations to the county prosecuting attorney or city
director of law that it considers necessary to protect any children that are brought to its atten-
tion.").
25. 38 AM. JUR. Trials §31 (2005); see also Campbell v. Burton, 750 N.E.2d 539, 545 (Ohio
2001) (where the Ohio Supreme Court held that OHio REV. CODE ANN. §2151.99 expressly
imposes liability on school districts for failure to perform the duty to report known or suspected
child abuse).
26. See, e.g., Ward v. Greene, 839 A.2d 1259, 1270 (Conn. 2004) (holding that Connecticut's
child abuse reporting laws only protect "children who have been abused or neglected and are, or
should have been, the subject of the mandated report."); Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1191-
92 (Utah 1989) (holding that Utah's child abuse reporting statute imposes a duty on the state and
county to "protect children who are identified to them as suspected victims of child abuse," not
to create a legally enforceable duty ... to protect all children from child abuse in all circum-
stances.").
27. Yates v. Mansfield Bd. of Educ., 808 N.E.2d 861, 871 (Ohio 2004) ("We hold that...a
board of education may be held liable when its failure to report the sexual abuse of a minor stu-
dent by a teacher.., proximately results in the sexual abuse of another minor student by the same
teacher."
28. See infra Part H.
[Vol. 36, No. I
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Under § 1983 and Title IX, however, school districts can avoid liability
if they demonstrate that once a school official received notice of the inci-
dent, the school official did not act with deliberate indifference, notwith-
standing the school official's ineffective actions.29 Under common law
negligence, school districts may also avoid liability if they can demon-
strate that the school official's actions were not the proximate cause or a
substantial factor in the injury.3"
The standard under the Ohio child abuse reporting statute resembles
strict liability,3' such that if a school official fails to report the allegation
of abuse to a child services agency and that teacher subsequently abus-
es another student, the school district will be held civilly liable as a mat-
ter of law. 2 This is true even if the school official conducted an investi-
gation in good faith and concluded that the student's allegations were
without merit.33
The Ohio approach arguably provides students with more protection
from sexual abuse because school officials faced with the threat of civil
liability and costly litigation have a higher likelihood of reporting inci-
dents of sexual abuse to child social services agencies.
Part I of this Article examines why the Ohio Supreme Court extended
the duty to unknown future victims, contravening how other states with
similar reporting statutes have ruled. Part II compares the Ohio approach
with other remedies available to students and argues that adopting the
Ohio approach will furnish students with greater protection from sexual
abuse than protections provided under other available remedies. Part III
presents the potential negative repercussions of adopting the Ohio
approach and discusses how to limit the detrimental effects. It also sug-
gests the benefits of adopting additional measures to supplement the
child abuse reporting law.
29. See id.
30. See infra Part II.
31. See infra pp. 24-25.
32. The Statute of Limitations in Ohio is two years from the time that either the victim of
the offense reaches the age of majority, or from the time that a public children services agency,
or a municipal or county peace officer that is not the parent or guardian of the child has been noti-
fied of the suspected abuse or neglect. Omo REV. CODE ANN. §2901.13(A)(b) (Anderson 2004),
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2901.13(l) (Anderson 2004).
33. See infra Part I.
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II. THE OHIO SUPREME COURT'S DECISION TO
EXTEND A DUTY TO UNKNOWN THIRD PARTIES
A. Yates v. Mansfield Board of Education34
Amanda, a ninth-grade student at Mansfield Senior High School,
reported to school officials on three occasions during the 1996-1997
school year that Donald Coots, a coach and teacher at Mansfield High,
"made inappropriate contact with [her] of a sexual nature" and "made
sexually explicit comments to [her]."35 The principal conducted his own
investigation and concluded that Amanda was lying.36 Public school offi-
cials took no action against Coots and did not report the alleged abuse to
the police or to a child services agency.3 7 On February 5, 2000, three
years later, Coots engaged in sexual activity with another ninth grade
student, Ashley." Ashley informed a friend of the incident, who prompt-
ly notified a school counselor 9.3 Both Coots and Ashley admitted to par-
ticipating in the sexual act when the principal confronted them.40 The
principal immediately called the police and Ashley's parents, and the
school district forced Coots to resign as teacher and coach. Eventually
Coots was convicted of sexual battery. 2
Ashley and her parents brought an action against the Mansfield
School Board, claiming injury "as a proximate result of [the school offi-
cials'] failure to report the sexual abuse alleged in 1996-1997 in viola-
tion [of Ohio's child abuse reporting laws]. '43 The Mansfield School
Board moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the board could
not be held civilly liable under Ohio's child abuse reporting laws
because the reporting statutes only created a duty to a specific child, not
34. 808 N.E.2d 861 (Ohio 2004).
35. Id. at 862. Amanda alleged that Coots "touched [her] with his hands and penis but [they]
did not have sex." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. Ashley helped record team statistics at a boys' basketball game. While waiting for
her mother to pick her up, Coots and Ashley went inside an equipment room and kissed. Coots
"pushed Ashley's head down and unzipped his pants, at which time Ashley performed fellatio on
Coots." Id.
39. Id. at 862-63.
40. Id. at 863.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
[Vol. 36, No. 1
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to subsequent victims of the abuser." The court ruled in favor of Ashley,
holding that a board of education could be held civilly liable when "its
failure to report the sexual abuse of a minor student by a teacher in vio-
lation of [Ohio's child abuse reporting statutes] proximately results in
the sexual abuse of another minor student by the same teacher."45
The Ohio Court of Appeals reasoned that because the reporting statute
used the singular term "child" and required disclosure of personal infor-
mation only of the identified abused child,46 the Ohio Legislature intend-
ed solely to protect the abused child.47 The Ohio Supreme Court rejected
this argument, stating that it was inconceivable that the Ohio Legislature
intended that liability would pivot on "whether the offending teacher
[was] considerate enough of the school's reporting position to avoid
molesting the same child twice."48 The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that
upholding the appellate court position would allow a school official
responding to a sexual abuse allegation to dispense with the statutory
reporting requirements, preempt an investigation by child services, grant
the public educator continued access to students, and escape liability
when the teacher abuses another student at the same school.4 9
Alternatively, the court saw the use of the statute's requirement to
'immediately report"... "knowledge or suspicion" that a child "has suf-
fered or faces a threat of suffering" any injury indicative of abuse or neg-
lect as a desire of the General Assembly to protect these children before
they suffer any actual injury or damage."50
The Ohio Supreme Court held that school educators and officials "have
a special responsibility to protect those children committed to their care
and control."'" School officials, in particular, carry a "special relationship"
with teachers and students in that they have "direct control of the environ-
ment in which teachers and students interact."52 When a report is received
that a student has been abused, the school official "should readily appre-
ciate that all of [the] schoolchildren are in danger."53 Hence, the court held
44. Id.
45. Id. at 871.
46. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §2151.421(C) (Anderson 2004).
47. Yates, supra n. 27 at 866.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 865 (emphasis in original).
51. Id. at 870.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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that the school board had an obligation to deal with "the instrumentality of
harm to one of its students for the benefit of all of its students." 4 Its mem-
bers simply could not rationalize prescribing a difference "in the situation
where the [official] to whom that child's control and protection has been
entrusted also has direct control over the alleged perpetrator, other poten-
tial victims, and the environment in which they are brought together."55
Thus, the court concluded that the statutory duty extended to other stu-
dents "when the circumstances clearly indicate that there exists a danger
of harm to another child from the same source and the reporter has an offi-
cial or professional relationship with the other child. '5 6
B. Other State Decisions with Respect to the Duty to Third Parties
1. States Extending a Duty to Third Parties Outside the Context
of the Public School System
Although the Ohio Supreme Court was the first court to recognize a
duty to unknown third parties in the public school context, two other
states, South Carolina and Texas, had previously recognized that a duty
to report sexual abuse extended to third parties in other circumstances.
The South Carolina Supreme Court was the first to extend the report-
ing duty, but did so narrowly. In Jensen v. Anderson County Department
of Social Services.," an action was brought against the Department of
Social Services to recover for the wrongful death of three-year-old
Michael Clark. 8 The administrator of the child's estate claimed that the
Department of Social Services failed to investigate properly a report of
abuse of Michael's brother, Shane Clark, under South Carolina's Child
Protection Act,59 which proximately resulted in Michael's death.6" To
determine whether the plaintiff had a private cause of action under the
Child Protection Act, the court examined whether there was a special
duty owed to Michael that could overcome the general rule of non-lia-
bility of government officials when the duty is owed to the public only.6'
54. Id. at 870-71.
55. Id. at 867.
56. Id. at 870.
57. 403 S.E.2d 615 (S.C. 1991).
58. Id. at 616.
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-480 et seq. (1976).
60. Jensen, 403 S.E.2d at 616.
61. Id. at 617.
[Vol. 36, No. I
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The court employed a "special duty" test comprised of six elements 62 and
determined that a special duty did in fact exist. 63 The court reasoned that
because Michael's brother "had visible physical injuries which pointed
to child beating," and the local child protection agency "could foresee
that serious injury was likely to come to the Clark children if there were
no intervention to protect them," Michael was part of a "clearly identi-
fiable class" that the Child Protection Act sought to protect and thus the
child services agency owed a special duty to Michael.'
In the broadest extension of the reporting duty before the Yates deci-
sion, the Texas Supreme Court in Perry v. S.N. addressed whether
friends of a child day care operator could be held liable for failing to
report suspected abuse.65 Parents of B.N. and K.N. alleged that friends of
Daniel Keller, the operator of a day care center, were told by Keller's
wife that Keller had "abusive habits towards children. 66 The parents
also alleged that the friends witnessed Keller bring a number of children
out of the day care center into his home and sexually abuse them,
although it was unclear whether B.N. and K.N. were among those chil-
dren.67 The friends did not attempt to stop Keller from abusing the chil-
dren, nor did they report the abuse to the police or child services.68 The
parents claimed that Keller's friends were liable under the Texas Family
Code,69 which states that "[a] person commits an offense if the person
has cause to believe that a child's physical or mental health or welfare
has been or may be adversely affected by abuse or neglect and know-
ingly fails to report [the abuse]. '"7" The parents' complaint encouraged
the court to adopt this requirement as the standard of conduct and duty
in tort law, making the violation of the statute negligence per se.
62. The six elements are as follows: (1) "[A]n essential purpose of the statute is to protect
against a particular kind of harm;" (2) "the statute, either directly or indirectly, imposes on a spe-
cific public officer a duty to guard against or not cause that harm;" (3) "the class of persons the
statute intends to protect is identifiable before the fact;" (4) "the plaintiff is a person within the
protected class;" (5) "the public officer knows or has reason to know the likelihood of harm to
members of the class if he fails to do his duty;" (6) "the officer is given sufficient authority to act
in the circumstances or he undertakes to act in the exercise of his office." Id.
63. Id. at 619.
64. Id. at 618.
65. 973 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Tex. 1998).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 302-03.
68. Id. at 303.
69. Id.
70. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.109(a) (Vernon 2004).
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The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that it was unclear whether
B.N. and K.N. were among the children the defendants saw Keller sex-
ually abuse in his home. Nevertheless, the fact that the defendants wit-
nessed Keller abuse any children gave them "'cause to believe' that the
'physical or mental health or welfare' of all children attending the day
care center-not only the particular children they saw being abused on
that occasion-'may be adversely affected by abuse or neglect."'" 1 Thus,
the court determined, B.N. and K.N. were "within the class of persons
whom the child abuse reporting statute was meant to protect, and they
suffered the kind of injury that the Legislature intended the statute to
protect."72 Although Texas' child abuse reporting statute at issue in Perry
is notably broader than other states' child abuse reporting statutes
because it imposes a reporting duty on any person who believes that a
child's welfare may be adversely affected by abuse or neglect,73 the
court's reasoning can be applied to narrower statutes as well. The court
simply extended a duty to children who were not the subjects of the
mandated report, but who were under a danger of being subsequently
abused by the sexual offender.74
2. States Refusing to Extend the Duty to Third Parties
Although there are other states that have child abuse reporting statutes
similar to Ohio's, these states have refused to hold parties having a duty
to report liable for the abuse of children other than the child whom they
suspect or know is being abused.
71. Perry, 973 S.W.2d at 306 n.5 (quoting TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.109(a) (Vernon
2004)).
72. Id. at 305.
73. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.109(a) (Vernon 2004) ("A person commits an offense
if the person has cause to believe that a child's physical or mental health or welfare has been or
may be adversely affected by abuse or neglect and knowingly fails to report as provided in this
chapter.").
74. In fact, the court elected not to adopt the statute as establishing a duty and standard of
conduct in tort due to the broad reach of this particular statute. Perry, 973 S.W.2d. at 309. The
court noted that "determining whether abuse is or may be occurring in a particular case is likely
to be especially difficult for untrained laypersons," particularly in cases unlike the one at issue,
where an individual learns of possible abuse through "second-hand reports or ambiguous physi-
cal symptoms," and thus it is unclear whether it would fall under the statute. Id. at 307, n.6.
Nonetheless, as the Ohio Supreme Court noted when referencing the interpretation in Yates, the
analysis of the Texas Supreme Court is illustrative regarding liability to unknown third parties,
and points out that there is a separate mandatory reporting requirement for certain professionals
under TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2161.101(b). Id. at 307, note 6; Yates, 808 N.E.2d at 870, n.3.
[Vol. 36, No. 1
Protecting Students from Abuse 43
In Ward v. Greene,7 an opinion released the same year as Yates (2004),
the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that "the class of persons pro-
tected by [Connecticut's child abuse reporting statutes was] limited to
those children who have been abused or neglected and are, or should
have been, the subject of the mandated report. 76 In Ward, an action was
brought against the Village for Families and Children, Inc. (Village), a
private, nonprofit organization that contracted with individuals to pro-
vide foster care and day care to children, for the wrongful death of minor
Raegan McBride. 7 Village contracted with Kathy Greene to provide day
care and foster care services to young children,7 and McBride suffered
a fatal head injury while attending Greene's day care program. 79 The
mother of the deceased child claimed that Village had received numer-
ous reports that Greene abused children in her care prior to the time
McBride was injured." She also alleged that Village had failed to report
these abuses as required by law, that Greene subsequently maltreated
McBride, and that Village's failure to report was the proximate cause of
the child's death.8
Despite a strong child abuse reporting law,82 the court limited protec-
tion solely to those children who had been abused and should have been
the subject of the mandated report. The court's primary argument for
limiting protection was based on legislative intent. Rather than creating
hypothetical scenarios, pushing them to their logical extreme, and exam-
ining whether the results were consistent with the overall intent of the
reporting statutes as the Ohio Supreme Court had done,83 the
Connecticut Supreme Court focused on the literal language of the child
75. 839 A.2d 1259 (Conn. 2004).
76. Id. at 1272-73.
77. Id. at 1263.
78. The court acknowledged, however, that that record did not indicate what interest Village
had in Greene's day care operation at the time of McBride's fatal injury, as Village had ended its
contract with Greene as a day care provider in August 1995. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1265.
82. Connecticut's child abuse statute reads, "The public policy of this state is: To protect
children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected through injury and neglect... and
for these purposes to require the reporting of suspected child abuse, investigation of such reports
by a social agency, and provision of services, where needed .. " CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101
(Rev. to 1997).
83. See Yates, 808 N.E.2d at 866-67 (arguing that if the court carried the lower court's hold-
ings "to their logical extreme," a school official would incur no liability if a teacher continued
abusing children as long as the teacher did not abuse the same child again).
January 20071
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reporting statutes to discern the legislature's intent." The Connecticut
Supreme Court reasoned that phrases such as "children whose health
and welfare may be adversely affected through injury and neglect...
and for these purposes to require reporting of suspected child abuse...
and provision of services ... to such a child and family"85 suggested that
the legislature intended to focus on children who were previously been
abused.86 Similarly, according to the court, the statute contained several
reporting requirements that focused on individuals who were previously
abused, not third parties who were in subsequent danger of being
abused.87 The court also found that the confidentiality requirement,
designed to protect the accused abuser,88 demonstrated that the legisla-
ture did not intend for children other than the abused to benefit directly
from the statute.89 The court concluded that if these children were sup-
posed to benefit directly, parents and guardians would have access to
information relative to the abuse reports.9"
Comparatively, as noted above, both the Texas and Ohio Supreme
Courts interpreted almost identical language as covering more than
merely the child who was the subject of the mandated report. The Texas
statute also covered children who "may be adversely affected," and the
Ohio statute similarly requires that "services [be] provided on behalf of
children about whom the report is made." Although not persuaded by the
laws of either of these states, the Connecticut Supreme Court itself
pointed out the extent of the similarity between statutes, declaring that
Ohio's statute is "almost identical" to Connecticut's.9'
A state court of appeals in Michigan also refused to extend protection
beyond children who were abused and should have been the subject of
84. See Ward, 839 A.2d at 1266-70 (citing various statutory phrases to support the premise
that the Connecticut legislature intended only to protect children who had been abused and
should have been the subject of the mandated report).
85. CoNN. GEN STAT. § 17a-101 (Rev. to 1997) (emphasis added).
86. Ward, 839 A.2d at 1266-67.
87. For example, once the reporting requirement is triggered, the report must contain
detailed information about the abused child, such as name and address, age, gender, and the
nature and extent of the child's injuries. No information is required about other children in the
care of the suspected abuser. Id. at 1268.
88. See CoNN. GEN STAT. § 17a-101(k)(Rev. to 1997) ("the information contained in the
reports and any other information relative to child abuse, wherever located, shall be confidential
subject to such regulations governing their use and access as shall conform to the requirements
of federal law or regulations.").
89. Ward, 839 A.2d at 1269.
90. Id. at 1269-70.
91. Id. at 1267.
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the mandated report.92 In Marcelletti v. Lux, the plaintiffs' infant son dis-
played symptoms of "shaken baby syndrome,"93 which they believed had
been caused by defendant babysitter Valerie Lux. The plaintiffs claimed
that a doctor had previously treated an unidentified child that Lux had
allegedly abused and failed to report the abuse under Michigan's child
reporting statute.94 Similar to the arguments found in Ward, the court
concluded that the legislature did not intend the "statutory reporting
duty, with its attendant civil liability, to [run] to any other person than
the allegedly abused child."95 The court held that the statute confined the
reporting requirements to the abuse of a particular child.96 Further, fail-
ing to report abuse could not be the proximate cause of the abuse of
another child because the confidential reporting requirements precluded
parents and guardians from obtaining any information regarding the
abuse. 97
Finally, in Owens v. Garfield,98 the Utah Supreme Court held that
Utah's child abuse reporting statute did not create a duty on the part of
the state child services agency to warn parents of potential abuse by a
daytime babysitter.99 Although the Utah reporting statute was broad in
scope,' °° the statute, the court stated, did not create a duty on the state
agency to protect children who were not identified as being in need of
protection."' The court believed that it would be impossible for the
agency to "protect all children from child abuse in all circumstances,"
and thus, imposing a legally enforceable duty to do such would be unde-
sirable. 102
92. See Marcelletti v. Lux, 500 N.W.2d 124, 127-29 (Mich. App. 1993) (holding that
Michigan's statutory reporting duty, with its attendant civil liability, did not extend to any child
except the allegedly abused child about whom a report should have been made).
93. Id. at 126.
94. Id. at 127.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 128.
97. Id.
98. Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989).
99. Id. at 1193.
100. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3b-1 (1953) (repealed 1988) (current version at Utah Code
Ann. § 62A-4a-401) (stating that the purpose of the child abuse reporting statute is "to protect the
best interests of children, offer protective services to prevent harm to the children .....
101. Ward, 784 P.2d at 1191.
102. Id.
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III. A COMPARISON OF PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT
LIABILITY FOR STUDENT SEXUAL ABUSE UNDER
STATE CHILD ABUSE REPORTING LAWS WITH
OTHER AVAILABLE REMEDIES
Three other remedies to sue school officials are available to students
who are sexually abused by teachers or other school employees: § 1983
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Title IX of the Educational Amendments
of 1972, and common law negligence actions. Because many states
grant sovereign immunity to school districts to protect them from com-
mon law negligence suits,103 empowering abused students to sue under
state child abuse reporting laws immediately marks a significant change
to the available remedies. It bestows upon the plaintiff the choice of
bringing an action under state or federal law (or both), providing the
option of selecting either a state or federal forum. Beyond this obvious
advantage, questions loom as to whether having this additional remedy
will provide a significant advantage to abused students. This section will
compare Ohio's approach to other remedies currently available.
A. Remedies under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
1. The Elements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code (§ 1983) is a pro-
vision of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, a post-Civil War statute initial-
ly designed to provide African Americans with federal remedies for state
violations of an individual's constitutional rights, but now its use
extends far beyond this original intention." 4 Section 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory... subjects, or causes to
be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within
103. See SPERRY, DANIEL ET AL., supra note 19, at 114 ("Although some states allow school
districts to be sued for negligence, other states continue to grant sovereign immunity from such
suits.").
104. See SPERRY, DANIEL ET AL., supra note 19, at 1089 (providing a short history of Section
1983); Barbara L. Horwitz, Casenote, The Duty of Schools to Protect Students from Sexual
Harassment: How Much Recovery Will the Law Allow?, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1165, 1172-1175
(1993-1994) (discussing the history of Section 1983).
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the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured-by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other prop-
er proceeding for redress."°5
To bring a valid claim under § 1983 against a state political subdivision,
a plaintiff must show: (1) a deprivation of a constitutional right, and that
it was (2) committed by an individual acting under the color of law."°6
The Supreme Court has held that § 1983 applies to municipalities and
other local government entities,07 which would include school districts
and school boards. 0 8
The first element is relatively straightforward. An educator violates a
student's constitutional right when sexually abusing a student, since ipso
facto, a student has a right to personal security and to bodily integrity as
liberty interests under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. "0
Proving that the defendants were acting under the color of law is more
challenging. Although demonstrating that a teacher or administrator was
acting under the color of law when abusing a student might not be diffi-
cult if the educator's contact with the student came from a position as a
government employee,110 it is much harder to sustain a cause of action
against a school board. The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledges that local
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
106. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992) ("proper analysis
requires us to separate two different issues when a § 1983 claim is asserted against a municipal-
ity: (1) whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether
the city is responsible for that violation.").
107. See Monnell v. Dep't. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) ("Our analysis of the leg-
islative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend
municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom §
1983 applies.").
108. See Lopez v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 351, 353 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that
the local school district was a local government entities under Monnell); Massey v. Akron City.
Bd. of Educ., 82 F Supp.2d 735, 746 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (stating that if school districts are local
government entities under Monnell, it logically follows that local school boards are as well).
109. See Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1062 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining
why the right to personal security and bodily integrity are incorporated under the Due Process
Clause); D.T. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F2d 1176, 1187 (10th Cir. 1990) (recognizing child
sexual molestation as a constitutional tort, but not finding the school district liable under Section
1983 because teacher was not acting under the color of law); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch.
Dist., 882 F2d 720, 726 (3rd Cir. 1989) (holding that freedom from invasion of personal securi-
ty through sexual abuse was well established before the alleged sexual violation took place),
Smith v. Stoneking, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990) cert. denied sub nom.
110. See Massey, 82 F. Supp.2d at 746 (stating that the teacher was clearly acting under color
of law when he sexually abused a student at school).
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government bodies cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior in a § 1983 action.' l Consequently, the plaintiff must show
that the school board itself acted under color of law by demonstrating
that the board established an official policy condoning child sexual
abuse or tolerated or ratified a custom or practice that resulted in the
deprivation of the constitutional right, both of which are relatively pre-
posterous propositions in this context."2
To establish the existence of a custom or practice, a plaintiff must be
prepared to prove: (1) the existence of a clear and persistent pattern of sex-
ual abuse by school employees; (2) that the school board had express
notice or constructive notice of the abuse; (3) the school board was delib-
erately indifferent towards the abuse; and (4) that the school board's indif-
ference was the direct causal link in the constitutional deprivation.1 3
As the four-part test suggests, to survive a motion for summary judg-
ment the victim must present evidence of a school miasma whereby an
educator engaged in sexual abuse acts with students, the school officials
knew or should have known these acts took place, the officials mani-
fested deliberate indifference in their failure to act, and this deliberate
indifference was a causal link to the abuse."14 Meeting this burden is very
difficult,"' as demonstrated by the small number of cases that have sur-
111. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 ("We conclude, therefore, that a local government may not
be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.").
112. See Id. ("[I]t is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by
its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983."). See also City
of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988) (stating that § 1983 also allows suits for con-
stitutional deprivations resulting from a governmental custom even though the custom may not
have received formal approval by the government body).
113. Doe v. Claiborne County Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996). See also Jane
Doe A v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis, 901 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing a similar test);
Horwitz, supra n. 104, at 1208-09 ("Plaintiff must be prepared to show a persistent and wide-
spread pattern of unconstitutional misconduct on the part of school officials that renders them
liable for their failure to act."), and see Massey, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 746-747 (stating that the school
board "tolerated a pervasive custom" of "deliberate indifference" to sexual abuse of students by
teacher, which directly caused the deprivation at issue").
114. For an example of a case that met this burden regarding sexual harassment by other stu-
dents, see Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified School Dist., 324 F.3d 1130 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that
a failure by school officials to institute discipline or stop sexual harassment by students could
constitute deliberate indifference, and that the school district's continued failure to adequately
train staff and students regarding school sexual harassment policies could be found to be a toler-
ance of a custom or practice resulting in the deprivation of a constitutional right).
115. See, e.g., Jane Doe A, 901 F.2d at 646 (holding that school officials' notice of special
education teacher's physically and sexually abusive behavior that included kissing students on a
bus, pushing students down the stairs, pulling students' hair, and putting his hand's down a boy's
pants did not cause notice of a pattern on unconstitutional actions).
Protecting Students from Abuse 49
vived a motion for summary judgment by a school board."I6 Section 1983
still remains an appealing remedy to plaintiffs, however, because courts
may award attorneys fees in addition to monetary damages."7
2. A Comparison of § 1983 and the Ohio Approach
Compared to § 1983, it is substantially easier for a plaintiff to estab-
lish a cause of action under Ohio child abuse reporting laws. Instead of
having to prove school authorities engaged in official activity that satis-
fied the four part test of § 1983,18 a plaintiff need only show that: a (1)
school official; (2) who knew or suspected a child under 18 had been
abused or faced a threat of being abused; (3) failed to report this knowl-
edge or suspicion to public authorities."9
In Yates, Amanda, the first student who was sexually abused, informed
school officials three times of the teacher's misconduct. 12° Although the
principal concluded through his own investigation that Amanda was
lying,' the notice given by the student was sufficient to hold the school
district liable under the Ohio child abuse reporting statute. Thus, to
establish liability in Ohio, a student who is sexually abused by a teacher
need only provide evidence that a school official had notice of the abuse,
and the official did not report this abuse to state authorities.
In addition, it is unnecessary for the person asserting abuse to estab-
lish that the school official acted with deliberate indifference. In Yates,
it would be difficult to prove that the school district was "deliberately
indifferent" because after receiving notice that a student was sexually
abused, the principal ordered an investigation and concluded that the
116. See SPERRY, DANIEL ET AL., supra note 19, at 115 ("A number of sexual abuse cases
have been brought against school districts in recent years under section 1983, but only a few have
survived motions for summary judgment."); Horwitz, supra note 104, at 1210 (stating that meet-
ing this burden is unduly difficult for plaintiffs). However, see C.M. v. Southeast Delco School
Dist., 828 F.Supp. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (surviving motion for summary judgment by adminis-
trators and the school district in an "appalling and tragic" case of repeated verbal, physical and
sexual abuse of multiple students by a special education teacher, primarily on school grounds
during regular school hours, which was permitted to continue despite many complaints by teach-
ers and plaintiff student in particular).
117. See SPERRY, DANIEL ET AL., supra note 19, at 115.
118. See Claibome, 103 F.3d at 508 (citing the elements the plaintiff must meet to establish
liability of a school board under section 1983).
119. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §2151.421(A)(l)(a) (Anderson 2004) (setting forth the duty
of required persons to report child abuse or neglect).
120. Yates, 808 N.E.2d at 862.
121. Id.
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student was lying.' Thus, one could declare that even if the school offi-
cial had a good faith belief that the student's allegations were false, this
belief would not protect the school district from liability if the school
official failed to report the teacher or administrator, who then later
abused another student.
It can be asserted plausibly that the Ohio approach takes an affirma-
tive step to curb sexual abuse of students by those educators who have
day to day authority over them. Sexual abuse causes extraordinary harm
to students and undermines the basic purposes of the public education
system. Indeed, the Yates decision serves as a reminder that states must
go to great lengths to ensure that children are secure while attending
public schools. By having a standard that resembles strict liability, it
forces school officials to report more incidents of sexual abuse to state
agencies.
Moreover, if school officials rightly or wrongly decide that a student
is lying and fail to report the sexual abuse according to state guidelines,
as what occurred in Yates,'23 the school official places the school district
in great economic danger if the teacher subsequently abuses another stu-
dent, even if it occurs years later." Given that many school districts
already suffer from an acute lack of funding, a costly civil suit could be
devastating. It seems likely that school officials will err on the side of
caution and report more school personnel to state child service agencies,
who will then proceed to conduct further investigations according to
state law. An increase in reporting by such officials to state child service
agencies has the potential to provide greater protection to students
because child service employees are currently better trained than school
officials to recognize when a child has been sexually abused.
Section 1983 does not require a prescribed, standardized investigation
after a student reports abuse. In fact, courts have stated that they can
foresee several good faith but ineffective responses to sexual abuse alle-
122. Id. (reporting that the school official "conducted his own investigation of [the stu-
dent's] allegations and concluded that [the student] was lying."). In Sauls v. Pierce County Sch.
Dist., 399 F.3d 1279, 1285, 1288 (1lth Cir. 2005), the court found that there was no evidence that
the school principal was deliberately indifferent to the reports of alleged misconduct by a teacher
after the principal's investigation failed to uncover reasonable evidence that the teacher's conduct
was inappropriate.
123. See Yates, 808 N.E. at 862 (stating that the school official concluded that the student
alleging sexual abuse was lying).
124. See id. (holding the school district liable when the subsequent student was abused three
years after the teacher abused the first student).
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gations that would shield school officials from liability under § 1983.25
A school district must only demonstrate that the school official did not
act with deliberate indifference in order to avoid liability. Because
school officials are only required to make a good faith, though ineffec-
tive, effort to respond to student sexual abuse allegations, students
would be better served to have a trained professional employee from a
child services agency conduct formal investigations to determine if the
abuse did in fact occur and begin proceedings to have school personnel
removed and brought up on charges. This is the principle on which the
Ohio approach rests.1 26
B. Remedies under Title IX of the Educational Amendments of
1972
1. The Elements of Title IX
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) forbids
public education programs from discriminating based on gender. It pro-
vides that: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participating in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject-
ed to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance. 1 27 Although Congress only provided for
administrative enforcement of Title IX, the Supreme Court held that
Title IX is also enforceable by way of an implied private right of
action. 128
In the landmark decision of Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools,29 the U.S. Supreme Court carved out the role Title IX plays in
125. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 1998) ("We
can foresee many good faith but ineffective responses that might satisfy a school official's obli-
gation in these situations, e.g., warning the state actor, notifying the student's parents, or remov-
ing the student from the teacher's class.") (quoting Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443,
456 n.12 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Lankford v. Doe, 513 U.S. 815 (1994));
cf. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999) (refusing to hold that "admin-
istrators must engage in particular disciplinary action" to avoid liability).
126. See OI-uo REv. CODE ANN. §2151.421(F)(1) (Anderson 2004) (requiring the child serv-
ices agency to conduct an investigation within twenty-four hours of the report that is in cooper-
ation with the law enforcement agency and is in accordance with statutory and administrative
guidelines).
127. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
128. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
129. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
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incidents of student sexual harassment and abuse in kindergarten through
twelfth grade. The Supreme Court ruled that a student who suffered inten-
tional sexual harassment or abuse by a teacher or other school employee
can employ Title IX to seek monetary damages. 130 Nevertheless, as with §
1983, Title IX does not bestow a right upon students to sue school districts
under the principle of respondeat superior.131 A school district is liable for
monetary damages when the student provides proof of intentional dis-
crimination by the funding recipient, which is normally demonstrated by
how school personnel handled the problem of sexual harassment or
abuse. 132
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District3 the United
States Supreme Court outlined when a school district can be held liable
for monetary damages under Title IX for staff to student sexual abuse. A
student must establish that "an official of the school district who, at a
minimum, ha[d] authority to institute corrective measures on the dis-
trict's behalf ha[d] actual notice of, and [was] deliberately indifferent to,
the teacher's misconduct."' 34 The Court did not specify, however, what
constitutes "actual notice" and "deliberate indifference."
Lower courts have struggled to define the legal parameters of the Title
IX actual notice requirement after Gebser. In Gebser, the Court found
that the notice received by a principal of a teacher's sexually suggestive
comments made during class "was plainly insufficient to alert the prin-
cipal to the possibility that [the teacher] was involved in a sexual rela-
tionship with a student."'' 35 Thus, it seems that actual notice by a school
official requires more than one report of inappropriate teacher conduct
that is not of a severe nature.
130. Id. at 75.
131. The Supreme Court reasoned that whereas Title VII sought to provide remedies for
injuries suffered because of past discrimination and applied to all employers without regard to
federal funding, Title IX sought to protect individuals from discrimination by those who receive
federal funds. Title IX was enacted under Congress' spending power and was contractual in
nature. When schools accepted federal funds, the Court believed that school districts agreed not
to discriminate on the basis of sex. It is unlikely, however, that school districts further agreed to
become liable whenever its employees discriminated on the basis of sex without the school dis-
trict's knowledge. The Supreme Court also reasoned that Title IX itself contained provisions indi-
cating that Congress did not intend to allow recovery solely on principles of vicarious liability or
constructive notice. For example, Title IX's express means of enforcement was by administrative
agencies, which operate on assumptions that officials had actual notice of the prohibited dis-
crimination. Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
132. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 641 (1999).
133. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
134. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
135. Id. at 292.
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Exactly how much must be reported before a court can conclude the
school official has actual notice of teacher misconduct has been a diffi-
cult line for courts to draw. Many courts subscribe to the reasoning set
forth in Gordon v. Ottumwa Community School'36 and Doe v. School
Administrative District No. 19.137 In Gordon, the court held that actual
notice requires more than a "simple report of inappropriate conduct" by
the school employee, but the standard is not set so high that a school dis-
trict is not put on notice until it receives a clear, credible report that a stu-
dent has been sexually abused. 38 A school district is considered to have
notice at some point between these poles.'39
Hence, courts vary in their interpretations of actual notice; it is not
enough to establish liability if the school official only hears of one report
of teacher misconduct not of a severe nature. On the other hand, courts
do not require the complaint to be "undisputed or uncorroborated before
it can be considered to fairly alert the school district of the potential for
sexual [abuse]."' Some courts take into account various indicia of the
reliability of reports such as the specificity of the information, the source
of information, and the manner in which the information was reported. 4 '
Nevertheless, as long as the notice provided falls between the two poles
espoused in Gordon, so that a reasonable jury could find that a school
official had actual notice, courts will allow plaintiffs to proceed with
their claim.'42
Lower courts have also struggled to define the limits of the "deliber-
ate indifference" requirement the Supreme Court set forth in Gebser.
136. 115 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (S.D. Iowa 2000).
137. 66 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. Me. 1999).
138. See Gordon v. Ottumwa Community Sch. Dist., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082 (S.D. Iowa
2000) (citation omitted).
139. Id.
140. Doe A. v. Green, 298 F Supp. 2d 1025, 1034 (D. Nev. 2004). See also Baynard v.
Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 238 note 9 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that the requirement of actual notice
could have been satisfied by the knowledge that a student was being abused by the teacher, as it
was not necessary to know exactly which student was being abused).
141. See Gordon, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 ("[T]he Court concludes a reasonable fact finder
could find from the specificity of the information, its source... and the manner in which it was
reported that the report had enough indicia of credibility to put the District on notice ....").
142. See, e.g., id. ("If the Plaintiffs are able to prove their allegations concerning the reports
made to the school district... this Court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that those
reports were sufficient to establish acts of sexual harassment of which school officials had actu-
al notice.") and see, Massey, 82 F. Supp. 2d at744 (declaring that actual notice requires "an agent
of the school [to be] aware of facts that indicate a likelihood of discrimination" and that this can
also be met "when notice is given to any employee whom the school has designated to respond
to harassment complaints").
January 2007]
54 Journal of Law & Education
Gebser indicated that when school officials fail to act or act in a manner
that is unreasonable given the situation at hand, school districts may be
liable for an official decision not to end the abuse.143 This standard, how-
ever, does little to provide lower courts with guidance on how to evalu-
ate whether a school district was deliberately indifferent to reports of
student sexual abuse.
Federal circuit courts of appeal have defined school district deliberate
indifference in several ways. For example, the Ninth Circuit found that
school districts would be held liable if "the need for intervention was so
obvious, or if inaction was so likely to result in [sexual abuse], that it can
be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need,"'" or when a
school district has a "conscious or reckless disregard of the conse-
quences of [its] acts or omissions."'45 The U.S. Supreme Court, outside
the context of Title IX, defined deliberate indifference as "a state of
mind more blameworthy than negligence" but "is satisfied by something
less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with
knowledge that harm will result."'" The Fourth Circuit held that "actions
that in hindsight are 'unfortunate' or even 'imprudent"' would not con-
stitute deliberate indifference.' The Eighth Circuit developed a bright-
line approach and concluded that a school district would not be found
liable for deliberate indifference unless it "turn[s] a blind eye and [does]
nothing,"'48 but this rule has been flatly rejected by other courts."'
As previously discussed and as indicated above, acting with deliber-
ate indifference is not necessarily equivalent to responding ineffectively
to allegations of sexual abuse. Courts have stated that they can foresee
several good faith but ineffective responses to sexual abuse allegations
that would shield school officials from liability, because school officials
are not acting deliberately indifferent. 150
143. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
144. Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 .3d 1022, 1034 (9th Cir. 1998).
145. Henkle v. Gregory, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (D. Nevada 2001) (citing 9th Cir. Civ. Jury
Instr. 11.3.5 (1997)).
146. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
147. Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 627 (4th Cir. 1997).
148. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 1999).
149. See Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 260-61 (6th Cir. 2000)
("Such a minimalist response is not within the contemplation of a reasonable response."); Doe,
298 F Supp.2d 1025, 1036 ("Permitting a school district to avoid liability on the basis of some
minimalist and ineffective response to discrimination would be inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's ruling that responses which are 'clearly unreasonable' constitute deliberate indifference.").
150. See sources cited supra note 123.
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As with actual notice, courts are free to conclude that a school dis-
trict's conduct, as a matter of law, did or did not amount to deliberate
indifference."' Many courts leave the question of deliberate indifference
for the jury to decide whether the plaintiffs provide enough evidence that
a reasonable trier of fact could make such a finding.' 2
2. A Comparison of Title IX and the Ohio Approach
The differences between an action brought against a school district
under Title IX and under state child abuse reporting laws will depend on
the jurisdiction in which the suit is brought. Nevertheless, general com-
parisons of these remedies are warranted. Under the Ohio child abuse
reporting statutes, a school district will be held liable when: (1) a school
official; (2) who knew or suspected a child under eighteen had been
abused or faced a threat of being abused; (3) failed to report this knowl-
edge or suspicion to public authorities.'53 Under Title IX, a district is held
liable when: (1) a school official who has the authority to address the dis-
crimination and institute corrective measures; (2) had actual notice of the
discrimination; (3) but was deliberately indifferent to the discrimina-
tion.'54 Similar to the discussion comparing § 1983 to the Ohio remedy,
the Ohio remedy provides more protection to students than Title IX.
151. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 649 ("In an appropriate case, there is no reason why courts, on
a motion to dismiss, for summary judgment, or for a directed verdict, could not identify a
response as not 'clearly unreasonable' as a matter of law.").
152. See Hart v. Paint Valley Local Sch. Dist., No. C2-01-004, 2002 WL 31951264, at *9
(S.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2002) (stating that the deliberate indifference standard "does not lend itself
well to a determination by the Court on summary judgment). See also Doe, 298 F. Supp.2d at
1036 (deciding not to rule on whether a school district was deliberately indifferent as a matter of
law, but holding that a reasonable jury could find that the school district acted with deliberate
indifference). An illustrative example of a U.S. Supreme Court Title IX claim that arose out of
the differing scenario of harassment by a fellow student, rather than by a teacher, is demonstrat-
ed in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999). The Court noted that
while it is more difficult to satisfy the requirements when the harassment at issue is peer-to-peer
rather than teacher-to-student, it is nonetheless possible. Id. at 653. Specifically, the Court held
that in such a case: (1) "the deliberate indifference must, at a minimum, 'cause [students] to
undergo' harassment or 'make them liable or vulnerable' to it;" and (2) "the harassment must take
place in a context subject to the school district's control." at 644-645. In all, to establish a viola-
tion of Title IX in this case, "the plaintiff must establish sexual harassment of students that is so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the vic-
tims' educational experience, that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an
institution's resources and opportunities." at 651.
153. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §2151.421 (A)(1)(a) (Anderson 2004) (setting forth the duty
of required persons to report child abuse or neglect).
154. See Gebser, 524 U.S.at 277 (outlining the elements of a Title IX discrimination action).
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Under Title IX, although a plaintiff does not need to establish a pat-
tern or practice of sexual abuse in the school district, or a causal link
between the deliberate indifference and the abuse as with § 1983, the
student must provide enough evidence so that a reasonable jury could
find that a school official had actual notice of the possibility of sexual
abuse by a teacher and acted with deliberate indifference. Under the
Ohio child abuse reporting remedy, the law affords fewer opportunities
for a school district to escape liability.
Under Yates, if a school official fails to report the allegation of abuse by
one student to the appropriate authorities, and the same teacher subse-
quently abuses another student, the school district will be held liable as a
matter of law. A plaintiff is not required to bring forth enough evidence so
that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the school official had actual
notice and acted with deliberate indifference. A plaintiff must only bring
forth evidence that the school official was informed once that abuse had
occurred and did not report the incident to a child social services agency.
A comparison of Title IX and the Ohio approach leads one to the same
conclusion that emerged from the comparison of § 1983 and the Ohio
approach. That is, the Ohio approach will better protect students from
sexual abuse because school officials will report more incidents of abuse
to state authorities. As with § 1983, conducting an investigation in good
faith after receiving a report of sexual abuse but failing to report the inci-
dent to state authorities will most likely be sufficient to avoid liability
under Title IX because a plaintiff will not be able to show that the school
official acted with "deliberate indifference," even if the same teacher
abuses again.
Courts have defined "deliberate indifference" as acting with a "con-
scious or reckless disregard"'55 or having "a state of mind more blame-
worthy than negligence."'56 Conducting an investigation in good faith
after receiving a report of sexual abuse is not acting with reckless disre-
gard, even if the investigation is handled ineffectively.' 5 Under the Ohio
approach, however, conducting an investigation in good faith will not
suffice if the educator subsequently abuses another student and school
155. Henkle 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1067.
156. Farmer 511 U.S. at 835.
157. See, e.g., Sauls, 339 .3d at 1285-87 (holding that the principal who conducted an inves-
tigation that failed to uncover reasonable evidence demonstrating that a teacher's conduct was inap-
propriate was not deliberately indifferent to the reports of alleged misconduct); Doe, 220 F.3d at
387-89 (holding that the principal did not act with deliberate indifference after he conducted an
investigation of the teacher's alleged misconduct); see also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 36, No. I
Protecting Students from Abuse 57
officials have failed to report the incident to state authorities. As previ-
ously stated, by having a standard that resembles strict liability, school
officials will report more incidents of misconduct to child services agen-
cies, who are better trained and equipped to uncover abuse and remove
alleged harmful teachers.158
C. Remedies under State Common Law Negligence Theories
Many states'59 do not permit school districts to be sued under negli-
gence laws because school districts are state political subdivisions
immune from civil liability."6 For those students living in those states,
providing a cause of action under child abuse reporting statutes could be
a tremendous asset, as this permits a student to bring a cause of action in
either a state forum under the child abuse reporting laws or a federal
forum under § 1983, Title IX or both.
For those states that do allow school districts to be sued under negli-
gence laws, such actions might include failure to warn or negligent hir-
ing, retention, or supervision of school employees, among other negli-
gence claims.'6 ' As with negligence theories generally, a plaintiff must
meet the standard elements of duty, breach, causation, and injury or
damages. That is, the plaintiff must establish that the school district
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, that the school district breached the
requisite standard of care, that the plaintiff was injured physically or
emotionally, and that school officials' actions were the proximate cause
or a substantial factor in this injury.'62
Once again, the Ohio approach provides more protection to students'63
because a plaintiff can establish a cause of action more easily under state
158. See discussion infra Part III.
159. A thorough discussion of potential school district liability under state negligence
actions is beyond the scope of this Article, as state common law negligence actions vary widely
across states.
160. Citizens generally cannot bring civil actions against state entities unless the state allows
for such actions. See SPERRY, DANIEL ET AL., supra note 19, at 114-15 (describing school district
immunity from civil actions generally).
161. See Doe, 298 F Supp. 2d at 1038-40 (discussing various state law negligence claims
brought by a student who claimed she was sexually abused by her teacher).
162. See SPERRY, DANIEL ET AL., supra note 19, at 114 (setting forth the elements to establish
a common law negligence suit).
163. The Ohio child abuse reporting statute covers private school students under the age of
eighteen. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §2151.421(A)(Anderson 2004) ("No person ... who is act-
ing in an official or professional capacity and knows or suspects that a child under eighteen years
of age ... has suffered or faces a threat of suffering any physical or mental wound, injury, dis-
ability, or condition of a nature that reasonably indicates abuse or neglect of the child, shall fail to
immediately report that knowledge or suspicion to the entity or persons specified in this division.")
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child abuse reporting laws than under negligence theories. Under the
state reporting laws, a student would not have to establish causation
between a school official's actions (or inaction) and the sexual abuse,
which could prove to be difficult in most situations.
As a corollary, adopting the Ohio approach may offer the most pro-
tection to sexually abused students attending private schools. Private
school students cannot invoke § 1983 or Title IX remedies against pri-
vate schools because private school officials are not state employees,
and private schools are not government institutions. Students attending
private schools must rely exclusively on state remedies, normally limit-
ed to negligence actions, so as to seek civil redress for the abuse. The
Yates decision, focusing on Ohio's child abuse statute, can be read to
indicate that entities such as private schools and private individuals may
be held liable under the child abuse statute. The law applies broadly to a
number of different professions including those in law, medicine, other
health care, psychology, and education. The education provision
includes provite schools."6
IV. POTENTIAL NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS OF
ADOPTING THE OHIO APPROACH AND
SUPPLEMENTAL MEASURES LEGISLATURES MAY
ADOPT TO LIMIT THESE REPERCUSSIONS
Extending a duty to unknown third parties under the child abuse
reporting laws provides a strong incentive for school officials to moni-
tor and curb student sexual abuse in public schools. Sexual abuse caus-
es extraordinary harm to students and undermines the basic purposes of
the public education system. Nevertheless, while the Ohio approach will
provide students with more protection from abuse than § 1983, Title IX,
and common law negligence remedies, the costs of implementing such
a policy cannot be overlooked.
Conducting a good faith investigation after receiving a report of sex-
ual abuse most likely would be sufficient to avoid liability under the tra-
ditional remedies if the school official concluded that the allegations
were false. As noted under the Ohio approach, such an investigation
would not be enough to avoid liability if the same teacher abuses again.
164. Yates v. Mansfield Board of Educ., 808 N.E. 2d 861, 864 (Ohio 2004).
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After Yates, school districts, in effect, do not have the option of con-
ducting their own investigations to see if the allegations have merit. The
possibility of negative publicity and monetary loss are simply too great.
If school officials conduct an investigation, conclude that the allegations
are false, and do not report the alleged abuse to state authorities, there is
the risk of exposing the school district to liability if the teacher abuses
again. A standard that approaches strict liability will cause school offi-
cials to report public school educators even when school officials are not
fully convinced that the allegations are credible, creating possible unde-
sirable effects on state agencies, public school systems, and innocent
employees.
In Ward, one of the primary reasons the Supreme Court of Connecticut
did not wish to extend a duty to unknown third parties was a fear of
overburdening state agencies with non-meritorious reports of child
abuse. 165 The court was concerned that school districts, in seeking to
shield themselves from potential civil liability, would "feel compelled to
report incidents that rightfully should not be reported, thereby diverting
valuable resources from the claims that demand immediate attention."'"
The traditional remedies allow school officials to conduct investigations
knowing that if they pursue them in good faith and in a reasonable man-
ner they will not be held liable even if their efforts are ineffective. 167 This
results in school officials acting as a type of buffer to non-meritorious
reports of child abuse to state officials. States adopting the Ohio
approach, however, will lose this buffer because school officials essen-
tially will turn the investigation proceedings directly over to social serv-
ice agencies rather than conducting the investigations themselves. On
the one hand, state authorities are better trained to conduct such investi-
gations and are more likely to detect whether a child was actually
abused. On the other hand, state agencies in those states adopting the
Ohio approach should be prepared to investigate more claims, many of
which may be extremely tenuous.
Another cost of implementing the Ohio approach is the adverse effect
increased reporting may have on innocent educators and the education
profession generally. As the trend increases towards reporting all sexual
abuse claims to state authorities, including those that are non-meritori-
ous, undoubtedly innocent professionals will be injured. While it is true
165. Ward, 839 A.2d at 1271.
166. Id.
167. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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that many states have confidentiality requirements in place designed to
protect the alleged abuser,161 these requirements restrict access to such
reports, but do not prevent those involved from discussing the allega-
tions. News of such allegations could quickly taint or even ruin a
teacher's or administrator's career, even if an investigation reveals there
are no findings of reasonable cause to suggest that the abuse occurred.
Already facing teacher shortages, state policymakers can ill afford to
give yet another reason why prospective educators should reconsider
entering the profession.
While these potential costs of implementing the Ohio approach raise
some concerns, they should not dissuade states wishing to address the
student sexual abuse problem from adopting more stringent reporting
standards. If protection of innocent educators is a concern, legislators
might consider formal training in how to detect child abuse, how to con-
duct a child abuse investigation, and how to properly report such abuse
to state authorities. 169
State legislatures could either require administrator certification pro-
grams to provide training as part of their coursework, or they could
require that state agencies provide this training directly to prospective
and current administrators. The legislation would still compel school
officials to report suspected child abuse to state authorities, but only
after an investigation conducted in a manner approved by state authori-
ties led to legitimate suspicions. To wit, if a school official received a
sexual abuse report from a student, conducted an investigation in a man-
ner approved by state authorities, concluded that the allegations were
false, but made a timely report to a child social services agency, the
168. See, e.g., CONN. GEN STAT. §17a-101(k)(Rev. to 1997) ("the information contained in
the reports and any other information relative to child abuse, wherever located, shall be confi-
dential subject to such regulations governing their use and access as shall conform to the require-
ments of federal law or regulations.")
169. Some states already have in place programs designed to train school officials to iden-
tify and report child abuse. OHIO REV. CODE § 3319.073 (2004) ("Each person employed by any
school district or service center to work in an elementary school as a nurse, teacher, counselor,
school psychologist, or administrator shall complete at least four hours of in-service training in
child abuse prevention within three years of commencing employment . . .") ALASKA STAT.
§47.17.022 (Michie 2004) (mandating that school district employees required to report child
abuse receive initial and periodic training in how to recognize and report child abuse); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §17a-101 (Rev. to 1997) ("The Commissioner of Children and Families shall devel-
op an educational training program for the accurate and prompt identification and reporting of
child abuse and neglect. Such training program shall be made available to all persons mandated
to report child abuse and neglect at various times and locations throughout the state as determined
by the Commissioner of Children and Families.").
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school district would be able to raise the affirmative defense, even if a
teacher subsequently abused another student. If, on the other hand, the
school official did not conduct an investigation at all or did not conduct
an investigation in an approved manner, and the teacher subsequently
abused another student, the school district would be held liable as out-
lined in Yates.
Affording school districts the opportunity to raise this affirmative
defense would accomplish a number of results. First, it would not deter
the Ohio approach's result of providing more protection to students from
sexual abuse. School officials would investigate reports by students in a
manner promulgated by state law and turn serious allegations over to
state authorities or risk exposing the school district to civil liability.
Second, it would grant state agencies the authority to utilize their
resources more effectively by investigating only legitimate claims of
sexual abuse. While it is true that the state would have to invest some
resources in a training program for school officials, arguably such a
training program would cost less than trial fees and the payouts of suc-
cessful student sexual abuse remedies, and it would also heighten aware-
ness in school officials and the public school system in general of the
seriousness of student sexual abuse. 7' Finally, instead of having to
170. A Note on State Child Abuse Reporting Training for Teachers and School Officials:
Due to the mandatory reporting statutes in place in all fifty states and the District of Columbia,
as well as the federal reporting requirements under Title IX mentioned in the Introduction, many
states have further enacted a requirement that teachers and other school officials complete train-
ing on proper compliance with these reporting requirements as a condition of certification or
licensure to teach. The following are just a few examples of the content included in such training
programs. However, it should be emphasized that these requirements vary by state, and therefore
it is imperative that the reader refer to the requirements of the prospective state as to what is
required in individual circumstances Ohio Rev. Code § 3319.073 (2006).
Ohio law requires elementary school employees to receive formal training in child abuse pre-
vention. This is an in-service program for persons employed by any school district or service cen-
ter to work with students, kindergarten through sixth grade, as a nurse, teacher, counselor, school
psychologist, or administrator. Each person must complete at least four hours of in-service training
in child abuse prevention within three years of commencing employment. The Ohio statute also has
a provision for students in grades K-6 to receive instruction in personal safety and assault preven-
tion, as part of the requisite course of study, OHiO REV. CODE § 3313.643 (2006); DEL.CODE ANN.
Trr. 14 § 4123 (2005). Delaware requires full-time teachers to receive one hour of training per year
on the detection and reporting of child abuse, under the direction of the Division of Family Services.
Examples of training presentations and video resources provided by the Division of Family
Services are available at www.state.de.us/kids/information/school.shtml; N.Y LAW § 6507
(McKinney 2006). New York requires that teachers and administrators receive two hours of train-
ing on the identification and reporting of child abuse and maltreatment in order to receive licensure
or certification. This training is now a component within the certification or licensure process. A
description of this requirement and a list of approved training providers is provided at
www.op.nysed.gov/camemo.htm; VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-298.1(4)(D)(2) (2006); Virginia requires
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undergo an intrusive state investigation that might damage an otherwise
stellar or potentially stellar career, innocent educators would be subject-
ed to a less conspicuous investigation conducted by a school official.
V. CONCLUSION
By extending a duty to unknown third parties, the Ohio Supreme
Court in Yates grants an additional remedy to sexually abused students.
A comparison of this new remedy with other remedies currently avail-
able, namely § 1983, Title IX, and common law negligence actions,
reveals that the Ohio strict liability approach does more to protect stu-
dents from sexual abuse.
Facing an increased threat of liability, school districts in Ohio and
other states adopting this approach in the future undoubtedly will report
more cases of suspected abuse to child services agencies. An increase in
reporting by school officials to state child services agencies has the
potential of providing greater protection to students from sexual abuse.
In addition, child services employees are required to conduct the inves-
tigations in a manner that accords with statutory and administrative
guidelines. 7' In order to avoid liability under § 1983, Title IX, and com-
mon law negligence theories, school officials need not respond to sexu-
al abuse allegations in any particular manner; moreover, liability may be
avoided even where responses are ineffective, perhaps even foolish, if
conducted in good faith."'
Although an increase in reporting may have negative repercussions
such as taxing overburdened state social services agencies or harming
innocent educators, states can minimize these harmful effects by man-
all teachers seeking licensure or licensure renewal to complete study in child abuse recognition and
intervention based on guidelines developed by the state Board of Education in consultation with the
Virginia Department of Social Services. Of the training programs reviewed, Virginia's program
includes the most comprehensive, providing an online training module available free of charge by
a state social services training provider. This module covers physical and behavioral indicators of
abuse, how to respond to disclosure of abuse and make a report, as well as example scenarios and
best responses to those situations. The guidelines and training materials can be accessed at
http://www.pen.k12.va.us/VDOE/suptsmemos/2004/inf024.html (last visited on October 23, 2006)
and http://www.dss.state.va.us/family/cps-pub.html (last visited on October 23, 2006).
171. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2151.421(F)(1)(Anderson 2004)(requiring the child serv-
ices agency to conduct an investigation within twenty-four hours of the report that is in cooper-
ation with the law enforcement agency and is in accordance with statutory and administrative
guidelines).
172. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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dating licensure-based pre-service or in-service training programs for
detecting child abuse that follow a standardized investigative and com-
munications procedure.

